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 ABSTRACT 
“Maritime sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) are complex 
issues of growing concern over regional and global stability. Significant possibility 
of high resolution conflict as an arms race has been accumulated. It may lead the 
region to a war in the future.   
China, as the most powerful nation in the disputes, is expected to be a key 
player influencing the situation. Several scholars have proposed solutions for 
China to resolve the disputes by peaceful way. Most of them pointed out the way of 
cooperation and various advantages of solution without war. 
This thesis reverses the trend of previous works by making scenarios of 
potential war in the SCS. System Dynamics methodology is used as a tool of study 
together with National Power principle as frame of considerations. The result 
draws paradigms of war in SCS which can be a conclusion for China to avoid 
potential war in SCS”  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Maritime sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea (SCS)1 are complex issues of 
growing concern over regional and global stability. Definitely, the disputes are underlying with 
miscellaneous interest such crude oil, natural gas, fishery resources etc. (Herberg 2004; 
Rosenberg 2010) Ten littoral nations have claimed their right over many parts of SCS for 
centuries. Among the disputes, cases between China and six members of Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN)2 including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and 
Vietnam, are the most concerned according to asymmetric power. Furthermore, SCS is 
considered as an important strategic area for world’s economic and security. (Kivimäki 2002; 
Rosenberg 2005; Shaihua 2006; Rosenberg 2010) Particularly the United State (U.S.) defines 
SCS as its area of interest as well. (Gallagher 1994; Ruscheinski 2002; Beukel 2010)  
 China, as the most powerful nation in the disputations, seems to be a key player 
influencing the future of SCS. But it always acts like what Deng Xiaoping, former president of 
China, said for decades that "since we can't solve the South China Sea issue, we can leave it to 
the next generation which will be smarter." (Xiaokun and Ting 2010) Such attitude came along 
with rejections to solve the disputes by the mutual benefit of all disputant nations. Consequently, 
significant possibilities of high resolution conflict as an arms race3 have been accumulated. And 
it may lead the region to military conflicts in the future (Klare 1993; Kivimäki 2002; Herberg 
2004; Santolan 2011) 
 Should war be a national strategy for China to achieve its goal in SCS? An answer 
might be “Yes”, since war is unavoidable, when politics could not solve the problems (Arnold 
1994; Henderson 2003; Anderson 2007). Besides, strategically, war is an implementation of 
National Power (NP) elements4 to pursuit national goal(s). The use of military power is war 
(Armitage and Joseph 2007; Bartholomees 2010). However, war is the answer that nobody wants 
it happen. 
 Several scholars have proposed solutions for the disputant nations to prevent potential 
war in SCS. For example, Tønnesson (1999; 2003; 2006), Rosenberg (2005) suggest a solution 
by the United Nation Convention Law on Sea (UNCLOS) or Herberg (2004) , David(2007; 
2010) Tønnesson(1999) suggest cooperation over sovereignty focusing on join development in 
the dispute areas and gaining benefit together. Most of them are in trend that point out 
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advantages of avoiding a war. In other words, they try to explain various good points of peace 
for preventing war.  
 This thesis reverses the trend of previous works by examining “If China starts a war in 
SCS”. In doing this, System Dynamics (SD) methodology is implemented with National Power 
principle to examine the potential war in SCS aiming to (1) build a generic model of potential 
war in SCS, (2) simulate potential SCS war scenarios in term of cost benefit, and (3) point out 
how the misperception of war might affect to China’s strategy systematically.  
 Simulation results draw paradigms of war in SCS and distinct dynamics of war which 
might be ignored. There are two distinctions of this thesis. First, this thesis applies SD and war 
which seems to be another issue which has no one done it before. Second, the thesis points out 
perceptions that people always ignore about previous war to potential war. 
 The report is organized from introduction in this chapter. Literature reviews are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  After that, in Chapter 3, problem definition is described and reference 
modes are formulated. In Chapter 4, hypothesis and model will be explained. The details about 
boundary, variable and relationship between structures in the model are shown as well. Chapter 
5, the model validation method and validation result will be presented to make the model 
justifiable. Chapter 6, all scenarios are shown and be discussed. In the discussion, some more 
topics related to the mimicked war will be criticized. The last chapter, Chapter 6, the study will 
be concluded and future researches are suggested.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
This thesis relates to three issues such as the South China Sea disputes, War and System 
Dynamics. This chapter, surveyed literatures are contributed to this thesis are presented.  
South China Sea Dispute and contexture 
Background 
The South China Sea (SCS) is a part of the Pacific Ocean, covering the area from the 
Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square kilometers. 
The sea plays various important roles for littoral nations by providing natural resources, food and 
energy. The estimated crude oil is at about 213 billion barrels and estimated more than 2,000 Tcf 
(Trillion Cubic Feet) of natural gas resources. Furthermore, as one of the biggest sea lanes in the 
world, 50 percent of the world's supertanker traffic passes through the SCS yearly (Kivimäki 
2002; Rosenberg 2005; Shaihua 2006; Globalsecurity.org 2010; Rosenberg 2010). 
 
However, the future of the SCS is still unstable, according to the maritime sovereignty 
disputes over the SCS among the littoral nations. 
Tønnesson(1999; 2003; 2006), Kivimäki(2002), Beckman(2010)have drawn SCS disputes 
which are all around the area of SCS, the most intensive disputes are between China and five 
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ASEAN members named Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. Each nation has 
been trying to claim sovereignty over the disputes according to huge benefit in term of maritime, 
geopolitics, economic and strategy. Such conditions make a low progress to end the SCS dispute. 
Together with interventions from 3rd parties like the U.S. who define SCS as a core interest 
(Gallagher 1994; Kivimäki 2002; Beukel 2010).  
Concerns over SCS 
The disputes arouse concerns among the disputant nations and the world. The most concern 
is arms race in SCS (Klare 1993). A number of medias and scholars such as 
sinodefence.com(2006) Keneda(2006; 2011) Santolan(2011) Wong(2011) and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute or SIPRI (2010)  observed about high military expenditure 
growth rate among ASIA Pacific nations, one of the reason is form the uncertainty in SCS.  
Moreover, as the imbalance military power between China and other claimant nations (see. 
Appendix I) also makes concerns that China will use this advantage to solve the disputes. This 
opion corresponds to Shambaugh(2006; 2007) that China’s military modernization is a step of 
preparation for its power in the region. 
Bartholomees ( 2010) noticed that  “...Strategically, one fights war at sea to deny the enemy 
the economic advantages of the sea (sources of resources or lines of communication) and/or to 
secure those advantages for oneself...”  
Shidal (2000) criticized that the actions of China in SCS are not only about benefit in SCS 
but it point to enlarge power in the region. Moreover he noticed more that this is an interior issue 
of China that China military tries to distinct it importance among other sectors.  
Recently, Santolan(2011) and The Singapore Institute of International Affairs 
(2011)reported that Philippine has deployed military personnel in SCS. And Vietnam has asked 
the U.S. to support its military capability.  
With high growth rate in economics and population of the claimant nations increase the need 
of resources to support their growth, this situation may lead the region to high resolution conflict 
in the future (Klare 1993; Gallagher 1994; Shaihua 2006; Shaohua 2006; Santolan 2011).   
 
Solutions 
The disputant nations have been urged to end the disputes by the peace way. There have 
been a number of solotions introduced for them as well. From observations, there are two main 
types of solutions suggested. 
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First, base on international law; Tønnesson(1999; 2003; 2006), Kivimäki(2002) 
contempleted about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)5  which 
should be the powerful tool of resolving the disputes. By UNCLOS, the length of 200 nautical 
miles will be an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)6 for the littoral nations. However, there are 
many unclear issues in term of law interpretation especially EEZ’s details of nation. Moreover, 
some claimant nations are still reticent to UNCLOS such China.  
Second, base on cooperation; Tønnesson(1999; 2003; 2006), Kivimäki(2002), Herberg 
(2004) , David(2007; 2010) introduced many solutions based on  negotication between the 
nations. However, the nations have to ignore any issues about sovereignty over sea territory and 
any historical conflicts between each other. They have to focus on sharing benefit in the dispute 
areas, making join-development together. However, China always rejects to solve the dispute 
areas to the mutual benefit of all disputants.     
It can be concluded the huge benefit make each claimant nation wants to protect its interest 
and leads the disputes in difficulty of solving. Moreover, the suspicious between each nation 
arouse multi arms race in the region. Such conditions are very risky of high resolution conflict or 
military confrontation in the future. 
  War 
"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final 
sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 16, 1953  
War has been developing parallel with the world’s history. Even the world now is full of 
peace and cooperation. But there are still numbers of wars running as well. War can be defined 
in various mean and it can be discussed in various dimensions.  
THE INSTITUTION OF WAR  
There are various term of use the word “WAR”7. However, the traditional term, originally 
used for the armed conflict, will be applied in this study. 
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The very ancient definition about war, Sun Tzu (544-496 B.C)8 had expressed the thought in 
his scripture “The art of War” that “Victory is the main object in war”. Brian Orend (2008), in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, mentions the Prussian military thinker, Carl von 
Clausewitz (1780-1831)9 who briefly said that war is “the continuation of policy by other 
means.” and “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”  
However, a modern military strategist, B.H. Liddell Hart (1985-1970)10 considered war in 
the level of national strategy or grand strategy which the factors of economic, man-power and 
moral resources are integrated to sustain the fighting services. However, the national strategy 
should consider the peace after war for its security and prosperity as well.  
Repeatedly and correspondingly, Yargen(2008), a war is considered as a National Power 
implementation to pursuit national objective(s) or goal(s); each country uses its power such 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to 
influence other nations to benefit back to itself. The use of military component is war.  
Bartholomess( 2010) had contemplated that war is about winning does not mean war is 
about victory. One can win a war, especially a limited war (a war that is consciously limited in 
either or all of ends, ways, or means), without achieving victory.  
Martel(2007) clarified that the victory of war is depended on the person who decides and  
the distinction between Victory and War11 he exemplify Saddam Hussein who claimed the 
victory in Gulf War I by the meaning that his regime had survived even his forces was moribund 
damage. Martel suggests that security professionals need to think systematically about winning. 
The implication is that military victory (tactical or operational victory) without favorable 
political outcomes is sterile. 
About the reason of war, Aguirre(2010) has discussed the causes of war that direct and 
indirect factors should be included in the causes of wars such poverty, inequality, greed, 
grievance, fight for natural resources with strong international demand (as oil or diamonds), 
restrictions of freedom and human rights violations. He pointed out more that the non state 
actors at war have been growing in the world.  
 Meanwhile the modern security school of thought, sustainablesecurity.org(2011)12, has 
introduced the moderate security perception about war that “as the dynamics of world,…there 
will be greater scarcity of three key resources: food, water and energy…competition for such 
resources should be expected, both within and between countries, potentially leading in extreme 
cases to conflict”13.  
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THE DYNAMICS OF WAR 
The impact of war has been discussed widely. As the more complex the world is, the more 
diverse impacts of war are.  There are a number of works about the impact of war. However, as 
this study intends to consider a war as a National Power14 implementation. Thus a frame of 
literatures observation will focus on war’s impact related to the National Power element.  
The impacts of war in Economics and Social, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), the authors of 
“The Three Trillion Dollar War”, discussed the wastes and defects of war on terror through the 
war costs analysis. They draw out the misperception of war cost and its dynamics which have 
been ignored. Such disregards actually broadly cause an effect obviously the debt of U.S. 
government.  
Likewise, Cost of War Project (2011), Dao(2011), Maguen(2011) and Eisenhower Study 
Group(2011)15 examine that costs for the war on terror are far from the past wars’ cost of U.S. 
government, huge costs at war now and more in the future for veterans administration, social 
security disability and other agencies to assist the casualties.  Moreover, as the long life 
expectancy, the cost for veterans will be longer than the past. 
Meanwhile, GlobalSecurity.org(2011) reported that in Africa, War has caused untold 
economic and social damage. It impedes food production leading to famine. The children have to 
lives of misery, the traditional cultures are destroyed.  
The impacts in other fields, Karbuz(2006 ) mention the DoD energy consumption at war has 
increased more than three time at peace16. Powell(2011) inquires that the U.S. military energy 
consumption is 80 percent of federal usage. The cost can be more than thirteen time after the 
logistic costs are included17. consequently from the increasing of energy consumption by war, 
Liska and Perrin(2010) pointed out that military operations as major industrial activities 
contribute significantly to climate change18. Karbuz (2011) investigated more about  CO2 
emission from the U.S. military operation which is 4 percent of total U.S. emission19.  
However , Lawrence Kaplan, a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College, contradicts 
that "The realm of war and peace exists separately apart —and justifiably so — from the 
economic realm," He contends that "economic answers to a non-economic question." 
(Radio(NPR) 2011)  
9 
 
The literature reviews about war have drawn the constitution and dynamics of war. The 
most important point that should be emphasized is the misperception of security professions who 
always ignore many dynamics of war and focus only national goal. 
System Dynamics approach to Security, Military and War 
There is a similar point System Dynamics and war theory, as Clausewitz said that “In a 
tactical situation [operation] one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, 
whereas in strategy everything has to be guessed at and presumed.” and J.Forrester expressed 
that “The image of the world around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model. Nobody in 
his head imagines all the world, government or country. He has only selected concepts, and 
relationships between them, and uses those to represent the real system."  
The two quotes seem to be the same thing, Clausewitz suggested a necessary that military 
strategist have to guess and presume for the higher level of planning, while J.Forrester  
recommend the method of imagine and conception for the real system. 
What the two philosophers had talked about is mental model in System Dynamics, and it is 
one of military decision principles called “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)20”  
In practical term, System Dynamics was applied to war by Coyle(1996; 1999), he used SD 
to model “The Third World War”, scenarios of war in Europe by applying SD to military 
operation. Coyle also used SD and Operation Research (OR) for defense analysis. He suggested 
that as a strategic tool, SD should be developed in the field of military as well.  
Choucri (2005) used SD to model state stability, his work covers internal and external 
factors of a state. Anderson (2007) developed the work of Coyle(1985) about insurgency to 
make a generic model of insurgency in Ireland. Torres (2009) has modeled the conflict about 
natural gas between Russia and Ukraine which expanded to be security issue. 
Supinajaroen (2010) uses SD to examine about perception of people on complex issue case 
in National Power management. The result found that in generally, people are lack of systematic 
thinking about National Power and they made low performance in managing of National Power.  
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Summary 
From the literature reviews, there are many works related to each main issue of this thesis; 
South China Sea, War and System Dynamics. 
However, there is not any work that integrates all topics together. For SCS, even there are 
some scholars consider solutions in systematical term, however, there is lack of dynamics 
explanation which might convince concern people realize about solution and it long term effects. 
For war and security issue, the lack of systematical thinking, let many wars are driven in the 
world now.  So, it is challenged to study SCS case by SD passed through various dynamics of 
wars dynamics which have been in the world.  
 
What the survey gives 
• There are many scholars considering war as national power but they do not 
consider the relation between national strategy (method) and national power 
(instrument). Moreover, relations between national power elements are ignored 
as well.  
• About SCS, even many scholars suggest solutions by peaceful ways, most of 
them present about the good side of peace but about the bad side if there is no 
peace. Moreover, there is nobody present it in term of dynamics for long term. 
• System Dynamics has been implemented to many issues about war and national 
security. For SCS as well, it should be challenged for applying SD with SCS. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Dynamics Problem 
  The process of problem definition in System Dynamics is to formulate a dynamics 
problem referring to the indicated behavior in the real world. In this section, the behavior of war 
must be defined. However, various indicators were used to indicate war’s behavior such as 
casualty, forces operation, military expenditure, education index, humanity resource etc. 
(Anderton and Carter 2001; Lai and Thyne 2007; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; Bartholomees 2010). 
  According to the framework of this study is to make scenarios of SCS war by 
examination of potential behavior of SCS war by emphasizing in term of cost and benefit. Thus 
costs of SCS war and benefits from war will be observed as net benefit to represent the behavior 
of war.  
  To define the problem, there are some remarks from the literature reviews about wars 
that should figure out some problematic behaviors of wars such: 
- Escalation and Prolonged war i.e. Vietnam War(Cima 1987.), War in Iraq(Galloway 
2007).These war were over expectation in term of the battle field zone and 
termination of war.(Anderson 2007). In this term, it causes from misperception of 
opponents’ capabilities.    
- Underestimation of war cost i.e. the War on Terror (Galloway 2007; Stiglitz and 
Bilmes 2008; Lutz 2011; Wheeler 2011) the real cost of this war has been higher 
than the estimation of the U.S. government.  
- The expandable of war effect i.e. Vietnam War and War on terror(Stiglitz and 
Bilmes 2008), the long term consequences of Vietnam War still exists as an 
obligation of the U.S. government about veterans care. Such effect is going to 
increase from war on terror. Or Iraq-Kuwait war(Tom Cooper 2003), the war was a 
trigger to the Gulf War which led Iraq to big troubles till now. 
 The remarks and examples described above can be concluded into a dynamics problem 
that war behavior is always different from the initial perception. As war costs are inherent with a 
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war thus the costs of wars are always over than estimation. In any dimension, war is always 
worse than estimations. 
Reference Mode 
A reference mode is a fabric of trends representing a complex pattern. It draws mental 
models and historical data to gives clues to appropriate model structure. Any time history may 
incorporate multiple patterns experienced over a single time path, over different geographic 
locations or over different periods of history. (Saeed 1998) However, when historical 
information is lack, a modeler must create a hypothesized reference mode. (Albin 1997)  
As SCS war has never happened, there were only a few small military conflicts in SCS 
(Tønnesson 1999; Kivimäki 2002; Kaneda 2006; David Rosenberg 2010) Thus the reference 
mode must be formulated as a hypothesized reference mode which consists of a simplified curve, 
typically drawn by hand, capturing the key features of the behavior pattern of the important 
system components (Albin 1997). 
Fundamental ideas about war in this thesis are synthesized from three remarks about war 
discussed in the previous section. The dynamics related to the war are captured to draw reference 
modes. 
The cost of war should be steady increasing at 
the beginning which is the period of superiority 
acceleration and advantage in military strength the 
war zone. It might be said that it will be increased to 
reach the desired cost or equilibrium level. After that 
when the war ends it should be decrease as Figure 2, 
the war on terror since 2002 till now. 
The benefits from wars are discussed in several 
points of views by many scholars. Some measured 
benefit of war indicated by index of gender equality or democracy(J. David Singer and Melvin 
Small 1974) peace index (Iden 1971; Aguirre 2010) or economic effect(Anderton and Carter 
Figure 2: US troop reflects war cost 
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2001; Koubi 2005 ) etc. However, in this study, the war is defined as a tool to reach of national 
benefit, so monetary term will be taken in account to indicate the benefit from war. 
However, in the real world, all resources are contained by lifetime. Thus the benefit from the 
resources utilized from area should be goal seeking and then decreasing. 
The net benefit of war can be mentioned by the cost and benefit comparison. The gaining of 
benefit will run after the war has started. Thus at the beginning, net benefit should be minus and 
then when the benefit start growing, the net benefit would be goal seeking growth and decrease 
according to the depreciation of area. 
How the behavior of war in SCS should be?    
The behavior of war in SCS can be mimicked from the past war mentioned before. The cost 
of war should be a goal seeking. However, as potential SCS war is naval warfare which is not in 
mainland. Even China wins in the sea, but the mainland of other claimant nations still function. 
So, after occupied the disputes area, there will be arms races between China and the opponents 
as well. Thus, the cost of war still keeps increasing.  
 The benefit should be an overshoot and slowly decreasing. The net benefit should be 
decreasing rapidly to minus at the beginning because China gets low benefit by high cost at war. 
Then it will develop as goal seeking and equilibrium for years. Finally it will slowly decrease 
because the benefit from SCS is decreased.  
The hypothesis reference modes are presented Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Hypothesized Reference mode Cost of War and Net benefit 
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CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS AND MODEL  
This chapter will explain the dynamic behavior of the system.  The realistic cause-effect 
relations generating the reference mode in previous chapter will be shown by causal loop 
diagram (CLD) and stock and flow diagram (SFD).  
The causal loop diagram is a method to explain the relation between variables of the 
system. All variables are connected by arrows with the polarity. The plus (+) meanwhile 
minus (-) sign indicate opposite change between the variables. 
Improving from CLD, Stock-and-flow diagrams will present more detailed in term of 
variable description. Using of SFD, it help the model building process to check the concept 
drawn in the model as well. 
A Mental model of War 
“War is the continuation of politics by other means… 
Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” 
   Carl von Clausewitz, “On War” 
War is continuum of Military Strategy which is a part of National Strategy to achieve 
national Goal(s). National Strategy relates to National Power elements. Thus, in brief, war is an 
implementation of National Power to pursuit National Goal(s). Each nation uses its power such 
military, politic, social psychological and economic together to influence other nation(s) to fulfill 
its will. (Bartholomees 2010) 
In term of Military Strategy, war is run by Military Operation. Thus to achieve national goal 
by Military Strategy, it must consider that the higher intensive in military capability will produce 
higher performance in Military Operation which will increase achievement of National Goal.  
 
 
 
war achievement of
national goal+
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Military Operation is proceeding of war which cost(s) is a part. The more a nation need in 
Military Operation, the higher cost to be implemented as well.  
 
 According to Clausewitz’s Trinity of War “the level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives” 
So, a war is not ended up at the winning of military operation in the battlefield but there is 
one more pocedure which is to sustain achived goal. Thus, when Military Operation has run and 
the nation achieve the goal, it needs to sustain the goal by more Military Operation. Therefore  
the relation between Military Operation and National Goal  is reinforcing loop. 
Moreover, any war is inherent with resistance(S) at least from the opponent; the resistances 
can be in any dimension e.g. military operation from opponent(s) and 3rd party, economics 
sanction and the deterioration of domestic economic. In one hand, the resistance increases more 
military operation and in other hand it will increase cost to the nation as well. 
 
 
In term of national strategy, the frame of considerations about war needs to be expanded to 
cover all national power elements. For total national power, it can be  derived by Clausewitz’s 
concept of winning a war(Bartholomees 2010) “The total means at his disposal and the strength 
of his will.” which can express as an equation1:  R = M x W 
R is power or resistance, M is the total means available such as military and economic in 
national power, W is the strength of will such as harmony an consentaneousness of people to 
support a national strategy, in other word, it is about politics and social-psychological. Thus to 
run any national strategy, a nation must maintain M and W to be high enough. National strategy 
at war as well, a nation must maintain its power in all dimensions. 
Besides, according to Art Lykke’s theory of strategy, strategy and risk are inherent 
(Bartholomees 2010). Risk of strategy is defined from various resistances which give negative 
effect direct and indirect to the strategy. 
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+
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As the national strategy focusing at war, thus direct resistances are military operations from 
the opponents or its allies. While indirect resistances, in other word, non-military resistances are 
any resistances that do not affect on military but on other element such economics effects, 
boycott of relationship or commercial embargo. Both resistances generated by military operation 
and they also produce feedbacks to nation.  
The military resistances will increase the need of military capability, this loop is a simply 
cycle of war which can be called as arms race. The non-military resistances are similar. They do 
not affect directly to military power. But they will affect on other national power elements and 
its relations. For example if the nation get economic boycott as a resistance, then the economic 
power will decrease. The decreasing of economic power will directly lower other national power 
elements. That is, the deterioration of economic will reduce national revenues; the government 
has to decrease its expenses which might be in social welfare sector or basic structure 
development sector etc. The people will be anxious about their life and start to object the war. 
The objection of war represents the decreasing of social-psychological power or national 
will(Yarger 2008).  
This is war’s dynamics the level of national strategy. War could not consider only military 
operation itself but there are some more factors relevant. 
 
Figure 4: Mental Model of War 
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A System Dynamics Model of War in South China Sea  
 MODEL BOUNDARY 
Model boundary concerns to the considerations of the model structures and environment. 
The boundary is the frame of work that guides modeling processes to be on track. Moreover, the 
model boundary will help people to understand the scope of model as well. 
 Table 1shows a model boundary diagram for the model designed in this study. Endogenous 
column is for dynamic variables involved in the feedback loops of the system exogenous column 
is for components whose values are not directly affected by the system(Albin 1997) and 
Excluded is for the variable or relation that this model does not consider or cover to.  
Table 1 Boundary of Study 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
- Operational Forces  
- Increasing rate of MO 
in SCS 
- Time to conquer SCS 
- Time of area being 
used(Utilization) 
- Utilization Desired of 
CH military in SCS 
- … 
- China’s GDP growth 
rate  
- Adjustment time of 
CH and Opponents 
Military improvement 
- Adjustment time of 3rd 
party support 
- Depreciation of area  
- … 
- War and Resources 
Price2 
- The feedback of GDP 
to CH military 
Expenditure3 
 
Period of simulation 
 This model will simulate for 80 years starting from year 2020 to 2100. According to the 
main resources such oil can support the consumptions for around 60 years.  
Causal Loop Diagram (CLD)  
 The mental model of war has been presented. Henceforward relevant conditions of the 
potential war in SCS will be applied to the mental model of war to be SCS war model.  
18 
 
 In SCS, a national goal of China is the dispute areas in SCS which are anticipated to be 
miscellaneous benefit for China.  Thus national strategy of China is to conquer the dispute areas 
and use it for benefit.  
 
OVERALL CLD WITH NATIONAL POWER PERSPECTIVE 
 
Figure 5: CLD of War in SCS 
 A System Dynamics Model of war in South China Sea is built to be a tool of simulation 
in this thesis by applying the relevant factors in to the mental model of war. However, the SCS 
war model is built on the assumption in the national strategy level which the entire situation 
must be guessed.   The model is divided into four sectors such China sector, Opponent sector and 
operation and result sector. 
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SOUTH CHINA SEA WAR SECTOR 
 
Figure 6 : CLD War in SCS 
The casual loop diagram above shows a war in SCS section, the desired area of China4 is a 
goal of this system. The goal determines China effort to increase its military utilization in SCS 
that will increase the superiority of China in SCS and China occupation area. By the way, the 
more area that China has occupied, it needs more military operation to protect from its 
opponents. So, the loop re-enforcing loop R1 also makes the bigger in relative growth of China 
military in SCS as well.  In correspondence to increasing of conquer area, it decreases the gap to 
reach the goal of the system represented by loop B2. This is a balancing loop which leads the 
system into a new equilibrium. 
Besides, as this relation is the same as arm race model which simulates action reaction of 
each side(Feichtinger 1997), the China forces operation in SCS causes reaction of the opponents 
by increasing of opponents forces operation in SCS, likewise the increasing of opponents also 
feedback to China to increase its forces5, the action reaction is represented in re-enforcing loop 
R2 . And the increasing of China force operation in SCS also increase the supporting of 3rd   
parties supporting to the opponents forces, this will be re-enforcing loop R3.  
Additional, another balancing loop B1 is generated from the opponents’ forces in SCS will 
decrease the superiority of China in SCS.   
relative growth of military
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china forces operation
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+
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+
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AREA AND BENEFIT SECTOR 
 
Figure 7: CLD Area and Benefit 
 Taking effect from SCS war sector, this sector represents the area in SCS that China 
will occupy by its operation. The occupied area will be the sources of China’s benefit from SCS. 
 After occupation of the area, China will start getting benefit. However, to reach the goal 
of the system, there must be time delays, superiority of China in SCS in war sector will 
determine two adjustment time variables in this sector. First, it influences time to conquer. The 
higher superiority is, the shorter time to occupy the area. And the occupy area will be utilized 
under the time variant to superiority of China as well.  
 However, the level of natural resources is a limit of utilization. Thus when China starts 
utilization, the depreciation of area will increase and it will decrease the abundant resources area, 
and then change to be devalue area which earn lower benefit. As the CLD above show Balancing 
loop B3. 
 NON-MILITARY EFFECT SECTOR 
 
Figure 8: CLD Non-Military Effect 
superiority of china
in scs
china occupation
area
+
utilization of area
depreciation of
area
+
+
abundant resources area+
-
+
B3
devalue area
+
benefit form scs
+ +
china forces operation
in scs
increasing of oponents
forces operation in scs
potnetioal non
military effect
+
+
non military
effect
+
+
deceleration
of ch gdp
+
R2
+
lost in gdp
+ benefit from scs
area
-
21 
 
If the war in SCS happens, there is not only effect in the region but the consequences of war 
must be spread around the world. According to the globalization, the world is almost to become 
one, so the dynamics of any situation in world community is very importance. In this case, war 
in SCS will cause effect in many dimensions in the world. At least by geopolitics value of SCS, 
more than 40 percent of world’s oil routes pass though SCS, 50 percent of world tariffs as well 
(Gallagher 1994; Tønnesson 2003; Rosenberg 2005). 
In this sector, the effect the situation in SCS will produce the effect to the world; the effect 
can be in any dimension. In this study, the economic effect will be taken in account and 
measured in GDP of China.  
The dynamics of war sector by reinforcing loop R2 will make China lost in its GDP growth 
rate. This dynamics can consider being indirect cost of SCS war6. However, benefit gotten from 
SCS will decrease lost in GDP. 
COST AND BENEFIT SECTOR 
 
Figure 9: CLD Cost Benefit Sector 
The sector does not make any feedback to other sector. But the dynamics from the system 
will be shown here.  Two main variables those are cost of war and benefit from SCS will be 
calculated together to be net benefit. 
Cost of war composes all cost that can be happen from war and its consequences. The cost 
can be considered into direct cost, hidden cost and indirect cost. 
Direct cost is a cost that China that uses to operation in SCS. 
Hidden cost is a cost which will happen after war such as social welfare, veteran etc. 
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Indirect cost is a cost which happens as an effect from war such effect in national or 
regional economic growth etc. 
These three costs are subtracted from the benefit gotten from SCS to be Net benefit. 
Stock and Flow Diagram (SFD) 
The previous section, the CLD present the points of view in dynamics hypothesis. However, 
CLD has limitation to distinguish between stocks and flows. Moreover some loops could be 
specified in more details. Thus, in this section, Stock and Flow Diagram (SFD) will be roughly 
explained, for the detail will be in appendix.  
 
SFD OVERALL MODEL: NATIONAL POWER PERSPECTIVE 
 
Figure 10 : Top view of SCS war Model 
National Power indicates the concentration China to run its strategy to reach its goal. In this 
case, the Military operation by China will run to achieve a goal which is area in SCS. When 
China achieves its goal then it gets benefit, the benefit will increase economics power and 
National power as well.  
However, military operation will increase resistances which are military resistance and 
nonmilitary resistance. Military resistance will press China to increase in operation, thus the 
operation cost will increase. Non-military resistance will affect in economic, this effect will be 
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cost of opportunity for China. And non-military resistance will decrease economic power which 
will affect in National Power of China finally. 
National Power sector represent the elements of NP, it actually is a relative value calculated 
by all element comparing one nation to other nation(s). However, this study needs to consider 
NP as a single power and four of elements are taken in account. The four elements are calculated 
to be NP by Clausewitz’s concept of winning a war mentioned before as an equation:   
R = M x W; R is total power of a nation, M includes military and economic power, W 
includes politics and social-psychological. 
This study applies the equation to be suitable for China. The political and social-
psychological power of China can be consider as constant, according to the political system 
which can control their people in the same way. Thus the model does not endogenous these two 
variables but set it constant at 1 as exogenous. For military as well, this study set military as 1, 
because it is the main strategy of China to use military power. But economic power has to be 
endogenous to the model. This power can be change by other factors. 
The national power equation is expressed as: 
National Power= (((military*3)+(economic*2))/5)*((political+social_psychological)/2) 
 The multiplier 3 and 2 represent weigh in national power of military and economic 
respectively. 
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WAR SECTOR  
 
Figure 11: SFD of SCS war sector 
War sector includes three main stocks which are Relative growth of CH military in SCS 
(red), Opponents Capability in SCS (blue) and Support from 3rd  (yellow). In one hand, the stocks 
are changed by the flows and other variables in the system, in other hand, the stocks also 
influence changing of others stocks and variables as well.  
- Relative growth of CH military in SCS is assumed as a ratio between the expected 
forces compare to normal forces which China always uses in SCS and equal to 13,300 
Million USD per year7.This stock is initiated by sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs set as 1 
and changed by a flow named incrs_rate__of_ch_utl_in_scs. This rate fills up the stock 
to reach the Utilization desired of CH in SCS under the adjustment time 1 year.  
 utilization_of_ch_mili_in_scs(t)= 
  utilization_of_ch_mili_in_scs(t - dt)+(incrs_rate__of_ch_utl_in_scs)*dt 
 
 Desired_of_CH_mili_in_SCS_improvement represents the expected forces need for CH 
to achieve its goal compare to normal situation. It combines cost_of_area_protection, 
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cost_to_conquer and ch_mili_normal_policy_in_scs which are the direct potential costs from 
war.  
 Needs of conquer is considered in two dimensions, first it is calculated from the area 
that CH gets from war compares to its normal area and second it is calculated base on 
amphibious warfare5 principle that CH needs five time superiority to conquer the sea.  
 Need of occupation area protection is from the conquer area which is a stock in area 
sector compares to normal area of CH in SCS which initiated by 350,000 sq km2. 
 Normal CH military in SCS is the normal expenditure of CH in SCS, initially as 1 
 
- Opponents Capability in SCS represents opponents’ capability. This stock is changed by 
opnt_increase_rate. The desired of this stock is the CH forces operation in SCS. However 
as the data of military expenditure from SIPRI in year 2010, the opponents have lower 
military capacity and there is a limit of increasing opponent forces in SCS by percentage 
of their GDP. Thus the MIN function is used for the rate as 
opnts_forces_desired_in_SCS =  
 Min((normal_opnt_mili_in_scs*opnt_mili_strengh),(ch_force_operation_in_scs_opnt_ 
  force_in_scs)) 
  And adjustment time for opponents’ improvement is 2 year 
 
- Support from 3rd is a level of the military support from 3rd parties to opponents. The 
rate filled in this stock is from the net forces in SCS which shows the difference between 
CH forces and opponents’ forces by the equation.  
Net_forces_in_SCS = ch_force__operation_in_scs-opnt_forces__operation_in_scs 
The difference is divided by the adjustment time 2 year to be a 3rd parties support rate. 
 These stocks are used to present the capability of each party in the war sector. Utilization of 
CH is multiplied by its normal policy to be CH Forces operation in SCS. The other two stocks 
those are opponent force in SCS and Military support from 3rd are added together to be 
opponents’ military operation in SCS.  
The two keys variables represent the strength of each side at war. The comparison of all 
parties is considered in three variables those are 
 Superiority of CH in SCS, this variable show the ratio between each side by the equation 
Superiority of CH in SCS=ch_force__operation_in_scs/opnt_forces__operation_in_scs 
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And it affects on two adjustment time variables in Area Sector those are time to conquer and 
time to use area 
Effect of war on world community, this variable is assumed as the effect of the crisis in 
SCS which will be sensitive to the world in various dimensions especially in economic term. 
According to the importance of SCS to world economic as the main route of energy and 
commerce between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, so there must be some effect on many 
countries in the world if there is a crisis in the area.  
However, the situation is defined in two ways for this study, of which first if China can 
conquer by the superiority higher than 5 then it can control and establish the area return to 
normal, all the ship can pass through as usual. So, it does not make high sensitivity to the world.  
In contrast, if China cannot maintain it forces to be higher than 5 times of opponents, it 
means the area is still in unsecured and the ship cannot pass through. It will be high sensitive to 
the world.  
The effect from the situation will be used as a graphical function as shown in Figure 
12Figure 12: Graphical Function of Effect of Situation on World community 
 
Figure 12: Graphical Function of Effect of Situation on World community 
Forces ratio China and Opponents represent the ratio between both sides, the ratio is used 
to approximate the lost for CH and Opponents in the war by the sub variable Possibility of Lost 
which are graphical function. For more details can see in Appendix 
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AREA AND BENEFIT SECTOR 
                   
Figure 13: Area and Benefit Sector 
 Area and Benefit sector states the war results which are the occupation area in SCS and 
the benefit from various resources in SCS. Three main stocks are represented the development of 
the area conquered and used. 
- Occupation area in SCS shows the level of dispute area that CH has conquered, 
initiated by 0. The rate of conquer to fill this stock is from the objective area which 
means the area that CH has not conquered yet. This variable is a gap filled under the 
adjustment time to conquer.  
- Abundant resources area is the area that CH can get high benefit after it conquers SCS, 
However to start getting the resources, it must take a period of time after conquer and 
establish secured area. The time variable used to the rate to this stock is time of area 
being used. 
- Devalue area is a stock which flow rate in from the abundant resources area with the 
adjustment time 20 years. This area has been used for a period of time so the resources 
are depreciative. The benefit gotten from this area is less than abundant resources area. 
There must be noted that in the realistic, Devalue area should have flow out as well. 
However, according to the life time for this flow is very big compare to the frame of 
study. So, this study does not consider about this flow. 
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 Benefit from conquer is a variable showing the benefit per year that CH will get from 
the area. As many researches mention in literature review, it is believe that there is tremendous 
natural gas in SCS sufficient for 150 year CH consumption. So, the model separates the benefit 
in two categories of area; Abundant and devalue production which are presented in two stock 
above. The benefit rate per area per year is calculated from CH energy consumption rate.  
 Time to conquer and Time of area being used are determined by superiority of CH in 
SCS from War sector. These two adjustment times are functioned with superiority of CH in SCS. 
If CH has high superiority in SCS, then it takes shorter time to conquer and use the area to gain 
benefit.  
 
NON-MILITARY EFFECT SECTOR        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Non-Military Effect Sector 
 This sector show the effect of war which does not come directly from war but it is 
unavoidable if a war happens. There are one key stock and two minor stocks to draw non-
military effect. 
- Non-military resistance as a key indicator represents sensitivity of world to the war, 
initiated at 0. The in-flow is from potential non-military resistance compares to the stage 
of this stock with the adjustment time of resistance active defined as 2 year. The variable 
Potential Non Military Resistance is determined by the effect of war on world 
community in War sector. The graphical function has been shown in the war sector 
already. The stock of non-military resistance is used as the economics effect which will 
effect on GDP growth rate of CH in the next minor stock. 
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- CH at War GDP and CH Normal GDP shows the development of CH economics 
indicator in two situations. The stock CH Normal GDP is given the growth rate 0.07 per 
year meanwhile the growth rate of GDP at war is disturbed by the effect of war so it is 
slower than in normal situation. The rates of these two stocks are compared to see the lost 
in economics per year.  
COST BENEFIT SECTOR 
  
Figure 15: Cost Benefit Sector 
As the dynamics of war was explained in the previous sectors, this sector will present all 
cost and benefit of SCS war. Only some main stocks in Figure 15 will be explained. 
This study categorizes the cost relevant into three categories. 
- Direct Cost is defined as the cost that directly used at war which are military operation 
cost and cost of lost in the war field. In this model, the direct costs are shown in variables 
CH forces Operation in SCS and Actual Lost of CH in SCS 
- Hidden Direct Cost is a cost that used in war operation but it is necessary after war has 
run or finished. In the realistic this cost relates veteran, medicare or social welfare etc. 
The stock presenting this value is After-war cost. The rate for this stock is calculated 
from the lost of CH from war. Life time of this cost is around 40 years according to the 
age of soldiers and the high life expectancy.     
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- Indirect cost is the cost that is not directly related to war operation. This cost is an affect 
of war consequences on economics. According to a number of literatures mentioned that 
war affects negatively on economic growth. This model assumes that the lost in 
economics is a part of war cost by measuring of GDP in Non-Military Effect sector, the 
lost of government revenue is implemented in this cost    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 MODEL VALIDATION 
Validation Description 
The reliability of any model should be represented by the method of validation which is the 
base to people to justify each model. However, it is impossible that a model will past through all 
the tests.  In this study, the model is tested by a number of validation methods including two 
main validation processes which are Structure Validation and Behavior Validation. The two 
main validation can be categorized in two three types of test those are Direct Structure test, 
Structure-Oriented Behavior Test and Behavior Pattern Test(Barlas 1994). 
The test of model structure will test the whole model together. However, the test of model 
behavior starts by each sectors separately, the base condition at War Sector which is the main 
sector of this system will be tested. Meanwhile the other two sectors; Area and Benefit sector 
and Non-military effect sector will be tested well. 
This process is to test on each sector before combination together as a treatment of the 
model. After that the test implemented to the whole model will be done again. 
Direct Structure Tests  
 The aim of this test is to verify the model by comparing model structure to the real 
system under the purpose of modeling. However, as this model is purposed to represent 
scenarios in the level of national strategy and the study purpose which points on making of 
scenario than making of policy.  
Thus, the scenarios are the situations which are assumed base on the literatures about the 
principles of war, national strategy and international relationship. And they are mimicked from 
some contemporary war. A number of variables in the model are processed from the existing 
information, some are direct information and some are secondary in formation. 
As Forrestor (1979) said that “In System Dynamics Models, model structures can be 
compared directly to descriptive knowledge of real-structure and model behavior may be 
compared to real-system behavior.  
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STRUCTURE AND PARAMETER VERIFICATION  
 All of the structures are based on the situation mentioned in the real world even it 
happened in other parts but it happened repeatedly as a theory. However it might or might not 
happen in SCS. By the methods of modeling in the previous chapters, it is reasonable for this 
study and the rest should be evaluated by the reader. 
 In the parameter, this is a weak point of this model in term of parameter verification. 
Because a number of parameters in this model such as time of CH Military improvement, time of 
3rd support, normal CH military in SCS etc. are inaccessible. Moreover some are different 
depend on the source mentioned. The parameters, however, are initiated conceptually to the 
realistic. More over they are tested by sensitivity test and the results show that those parameters 
do not change much behavior of the model. So, the use of these parameters still keeps the model 
on track of study purposes which is building a generic model independent to the parameter.   
 
 
Figure 16: CH forces operation in SCS if the Area Protection feedback is cut.  
Blue line is base run, Red line the loop is cut.  
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Figure 17 : CH forces operation in SCS if the feedback from superiority is cut. 
 Blue line is base run, Red line is loop excluded. 
BOUNDARY ADEQUACY 
 This test is a frame of modeling during the whole study. Hence this section will only 
discuss in some points. 
 Firstly, this model excludes feedback of economic indicated by CH GDP on military 
expenditure, according to the reason that the comparison between CH military and Opponents is 
very large by the ratio one-five times in year 2010 and consider to CH economic growth rate 
compare to the opponent’s, it is a big different as well. So, this study frame an assumption that 
CH has ample military capability to control SCS compare to opponents. 
 However, the test of this feedback also done, indicted by the variable CH military 
operation in SCS compare between determination by GDP and non-determination by GDP. The 
result shown in Figure 18 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of CH forces operation in SCS 
Blue line is GDP excluded; Red line is determinate by GDP 
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  The result shows that if CH force operation is determinate by GPD as percentage of GDP, 
it will be over requirement after 5 year, which is not reasonable in the logic of government 
budget decision. It is more logically modeling to the realistic by setting the Ch forces 
independent from GDP. So, this model the feedback from economic to CH forces operation in 
SCS is excluded. 
DIMENSION CONSISTENCY 
 The dimension consistency in this model is tested directly by the software using to build 
and simulated for this study. The model is tested of the unit consistent. 
Structure Oriented Behaviors Test 
 This validation aim to test the model indirectly by apply some certain value to the 
model. In this study several of tests are applied such. 
DIRECT EXTREME CONDITION  
This test aims at how well the equations in the model deal with some extreme condition. 
 Time of China military improvement = 0.01 and 1000 year 
This adjustment time relates to time to conquer the area. So, the expected result should be in 
the logic that if time of CH military improvement is very small, it means that CH military use 
very short time in filling the gap of desired area. In other hand if the time is large, CH military 
takes long time to occupy the area.  
The simulations in Figure 19: Occupation Area comparison by different time of CH military 
improvement show that the model still keeps on track in the extreme condition  
35 
 
 
Figure 19: Occupation Area comparison by different time of CH military improvement  
 Blue line is 0.01year, Red line is Base run and Pink line is 1,000 year 
 
Desired Area = 0 and 5,000,000 sq km. 
 The desired area is the goal of the model. The test expected that the model will produce 
the behaviors to reach its goal. If there is no desired area, the occupation should not be changed, 
and if the goal is higher than base run, the occupation area should be higher as well. 
 The results are show in Figure 20 
 
Figure 20:  Occupation Areas comparison between each desired areas extremely test 
Blue line is 0 sq km, Red line is base run and Pink line is 5,000,000 sq km 
Desired area = 0 sq km  
 The desired area is 0; it means that CH does nothing in the area. So there is not any 
effect to equilibrium stage of the system, the opponent forces, 3rd support and CH forces do not 
operation in SCS. All forces are 0   
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Figure 21: Desired area is 0, there is equilibrium at 0 in system 
 This means that there is no conquer in SCS thus there is not benefit area as well.  
 
 BEHAVIOR SENSITIVITY TEST 
This test aims to see that the function variables used in the model are sensitive for the model 
behaviors or not. 
Effect of War on World Community 
The graphical function is test by changing the behavior. The normal use for base run is 
exponential decay. For the test, it is changed to be exponential collapse and s-shape as shown in 
Figure 22   
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Figure 22: exponential decay (in use), increasingly decreasing, S-Shape  
 
Figure 23: Occupation area comparison in Function test 
The result of simulation in Figure 23 shows that there is no difference between each 
simulation. So, the model is not sensitive to the graphical function.  
China military Improvement time 
By this test, the adjustment time is set by the range ±100 % and ±50%. The result shows that 
the change of this variable does not change the model’s behavior sensitively.   
 
Figure 24: Occupation are with CH military Improvement time Sensitivity test 
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Opponent military improvement time 
The adjustment time is set by the range ±100 % and ±50%. The result shows that the change 
of this variable does not change the model’s behavior sensitively.    
    
 
  
BEHAVIOR REPRODUCTION 
This method is to see that how fit the model can simulate with the historical data or the 
reference mode. Because of lack of information, the real reference mode for this model could not 
be built. However according to Saeed(1998)  
“Last, but not least, any time history may incorporate multiple patterns experienced over a 
single time path, over different geographic locations or over different periods of history”.  
And Albin(1997) “When no historical information is available, a modeler must create a 
hypothesized reference mode. The hypothesized reference mode consists of a simplified curve, 
typically drawn by hand; capturing the key features of the behavior pattern of the important 
system components” 
Thus this study hypothesized the reference mode for some uncertain but presumable 
situation by mimic from similar situation in different geographic location and periods of history. 
 The excellent expected result is that the model can simulate fit to the reference both in 
term of quantity and quality.  Nevertheless, because the purpose of the model is to build a 
generic model which can describe the behavior of war, so only fitting in term of quality is 
acceptable.   
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INTEGRATION ERROR 
The time step using in the model should be suitable for the model. In this test, the time step is 
test by cutting down for half of the initial then simulate the model to see whether the behavior of the 
model change or not. If the time step used is suitable for the model, then the behavior should not be 
distinct from the base run. 
By this testing method, the used time step is 0.1 year, and then we change the time step to 0.05. 
The model still keeps the same behavior as initiated. So, the time step using is suitable and the model 
is not sensitive to time step. 
 
Summary 
The structure and behavior of model is tested by a number of methods and the results are 
presented in this chapter partly in this chapter. For the scenario test will be done in the next 
chapter. 
 Nevertheless, in this chapter, it is not all kind of tests can be done but the study chose the 
tests which make satisfaction of the model structure and behavior within the frame of study and 
model purpose. The model passed all the tests applied. So, by these results, it can be concluded 
that the model is validated.    
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CHAPTER 6 SCENARIOS AND DISSCUSSION 
In the previous chapters, the study conventions are settled, the model and relevant structures 
as tools of simulation are built. In this chapter, they will be used to simulate the base case and 
introduced new structures as treatments to simulate the possibility scenarios.  
Base run scenario serves as the normal war considered from fundamental war strategy. The 
considerations are based on military operation and resistance from the opponents in the battle 
field. In this scenario, traditional military though is applied under the consideration of military 
power leading to national strategy.  
Scenario one, the hidden cost of war will be considered to shift the paradigm about costs of 
war that used to calculate only military operation relevant or not. The hidden cost added to this 
scenario will show how the difference of war’s cost is. 
Scenario two, if the war is expanded to be a great war by the strong resistance then what are 
going to happen. This scenario, the 3rd party intervention will be introduced as a part of 
opponents. Thus the opponents’ capability will be very high. 
Scenario three, with the Great War in scenario two, according to the question to war about 
its side effect, if the non-military effect is considered, how the results of war are. 
Scenario four, if the goal of CH to SCS is resources. Then there is another way for it to gain 
the resources by avoiding of war. In this scenario, the regional integration is implemented by 
assuming that the areas are shared by China and each opponent. The benefit is shared and there 
is not cost of war.   
Table 2 all scenarios comparison 
Scenario 
Direct Cost Hidden Cost Indirect Cost 
Effect on 
National Power Military 
Operation 
Lost from 
Operation 
After-war cost 
Non-Military 
Effect 
Base Scenario Low Low Not include Not include + 
Scenario 1 Low Low Low Not include + 
Scenario 2 High High High Not include + 
Scenario 3 High High High Include - 
Scenario 4 No No No No + 
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Base Scenario: SCS War  
The base scenario presents the regional war which run under the hypothesis of China as a 
strong side against and the opponents as a weak side.  The goal of the war is area size 2,800,000 
sq km approximately1 or 80 percent of SCS. 
In this scenario, CH capability SCS will be increased by the desired area in SCS, however 
its movements will drive the opponents’ capability increased, this is a loop R1. 
 
Figure 25: Base Scenario 
 
Figure 26: Base run of Occupation area 
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Figure 27: Base run of China forces and Opponents force 
 
Figure 28: Base run of Net Benefit yearly  
Scenario 1: SCS War and Hidden Cost     
For the base run, war cost and the benefit from war are compared. The result shows that 
China needs almost 6 year to get net benefit in positive. However, when the net benefit has 
reached the peak point around year 2050, it turns decreasing according to the depreciative of 
resources area. 
The scenario 1 aims to present the idea that what actually should be added to the cost of war. 
The cause of this question is from many logical remarks that running any war, there must be a 
number of veterans which need some more continued cost to take care of them.  
Mimic to US war observations, some scholars mentioned that the health care and disability 
compensation costs for veterans from past wars came 30 to 40 years after those wars 
ended(DAO 2011). Also, Linda Bilmes, a Harvard academic who has done extensive research on 
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the impact of the wars, said that with the life expectancy getting longer, the actual cost over 30, 
40 or 50 years will be even higher than the projection and will peak later than past war.”  
So after-war cost should be unavoidable for the total costs of war and it must be 
calculated. Before the step of other considerations, the after-war cost must be implemented. 
This scenario adds structure of after-war cost and calculates it as a part of the costs relevant.  
 
 
Figure 29 : Scenario1 
 
Test of the structure 
The after-war cost structure is test by on its fraction and life time. 
 
Figure 30: sensitivity test at the fraction of after-war cost  
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Firstly, the fraction of lost at war 
which determine the rate in of after-war 
cost is tested by the values 0.02, 0.04, 
0.08(existing value), 0.1 and 0.16 the 
results are shown in  Figure 30. There is 
not much different. 
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Figure 31: sensitivity test at the life time of after-war cost 
Secondly, the life time of cost is tested 
by the values 10, 20, 40(existing value), 60 
and 80 years. The results are shown. 
 
From the sensitivity test to the constant variables of after-war cost structure, it shows that 
the model is not sensitive. The main cause of veterans is from operation war cost; the new 
structure takes a part from this variable by approximately fraction of 0.082.  
  The result show that earliest stage of war, the net benefit is not clearly, but around 10 years 
after, the difference is starting clearly. 
Thus, the scenario shows that it is necessary to include the after-war cost to the war cost 
according to its size in quantity term, besides this cost happens in any war. So, after this 
scenario, this hidden cost of war will be added as one of the model structure and considered as a 
part of war costs.   
Simulation of Scenario 1 
 Figure 32: Net Benefit yearly  
Blue is base line, red is Scenario2 (after-war cost is applied) 
Net benefit yearly added with 
after war cost is lower. 
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 Figure 33: Total net benefit 
Blue is base line, red is Scenario2 (after-war cost is applied) 
 
Scenario 2: SCS War with Strong Military Resistance  
In scenario 1, the normal cost of war is added with the hidden cost. However, the previous 
case is assumed on the perception of total war with a weak resistance. In this scenario, the 
environment of SCS war will be changed by the intervention of 3rd party. 
The intervention of 3rd party is in term of military capability promotion to the opponents 
operation in SCS. This treatment will make the opponents high capability compare to CH. 
In the model, the structure of 3rd military support is added. The support is a stock which 
flow in by the rate to fill the goal which is the net force between CH and opponents in SCS. 
 
Figure 34 : Scenario2 
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Test of the structure 
  The test to this structure will be on the variable time of 3rd support which is initiated 1.5 
years, the time that 3rd will take to support the opponents. The test introduces value of 0.5, 1, 
1.5(initial value), 2 and 2.5 years to the variable to see the change in Opponents force. 
 
Figure 35: comparison of Opponent Capability in SCS for the test of 
3rd support structure 
 
Simulation of Scenario 2 
As the new structure added will fill the gap between opponents and CH which in the model 
is “net forces in SCS” with the adjustment time 1.5 years, so this will affect on decreasing of the 
superiority of CH in SCS as  
  
Figure 36: superiority of CH in SCS comparison  
The superiority of CH is 
lower, according to the support of 
3rd 
 
             
Figure 37: Occupation area in SCS    
Affected from superiority, CH 
can conquer SCS slower. 
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Blue line is base line; red line is with 3rd intervention, superiority is no-unit. 
 
Figure 38: Net benefit yearly 
The net benefit yearly is keep 
going down. There is not benefit in 
positive. 
 
 
Figure 39: Total net benefit 
Blue line is base line; red line is with 3rd intervention 
The total net benefit is in 
minus till -33 trillion USD 
 
The results of scenario 3 are shown in  Figure 35 to  Figure 38. The superiority of CH in 
SCS is intervened by the high capability of the opponents which gets supporting from 3rd party, 
result that the superiority is decrease, the time to conquer increase thus the conquer area of CH 
does not grow much. See in              Figure 37, the occupation area does not reach the goal, so 
the benefit from SCS for CH is very low as well.  
The net benefit yearly of CH keeps going down from the high cost paid and the low benefit 
gain.  
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Scenario 3: War with Strong Military Resistance and Non-
military Resistance 
The previous scenarios, war and its direct cost have been presented. It is obviously that 
during a war, the priority is to win. No one wants to second-guess the generals on how money 
should be spent. However, today, no serious economist holds the view that war is good for the 
economy, so the question is not whether the economy has been weakened by war. The question 
is only how much(Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). 
This scenario will add the structure of war’s economic effect. The structure added presents 
the negative effect of war on CH GDP. The measurement is indicated by government revenue. 
 
 
Figure 40: Scenario3 
Test of the structure 
The test is done on by the adjustment time of 3rd military support. The test introduce the 
values 0.5, 0.8, 1(initial value), 1.5, 2 years. The result shows in  Figure 41 
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Figure 41: Net benefit yearly 
The added new structure 
does not change the model 
sensitively. 
 
  The net benefit yearly behaviors are still in the same trend. So, the structure does not 
change much to the model. 
 Simulation of Scenario 3 
  
Figure 42: net benefit yearly 
China starts losing 
with decreasing 
increasingly rate at the 
beginning, then when the 
benefit from conquer stars, 
it makes the lost slower. 
However, in long term, the 
effect of lost in GDP will 
make the net benefit of CH 
worse. 
Scenario 4: Alternative solution by sharing and avoiding war  
 As the basic assumption, that the goal of China is its benefit in SCS.  Consideration on 
China’s elements of national power which is a tool of a nation to reach its goal, there are many 
elements on its hands to control this issue. As the three previous scenarios, it can be concluded 
that war is not a good answer in any dimension to achieve the goal in SCS. Thus Scenario 4 will 
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guide an alternative way to “what else if not war”. This scenario is far away from war in contrast 
it points to the cooperation between the parties by sharing the right and benefit on the dispute. 
Only a part of all war costs shown in the last three scenarios is in account which is cost to 
protection. This cost is not meaning in military term. But it is normal cost implement for 
management of any area. 
 
Figure 43: Scenario4 
Simulation of Scenario 4 
The result of this scenario will be shown below 
 
Figure 44: benefit from SCS  
 
Benefit from SCS for Scenario4 is 
lower than base scenario, the behaviors 
are same. Compared with Scenario 3, the 
benefit is better. 
 
 
Figure 45: Net benefit yearly  
Net benefit of scenario4 is better 
than base line for first 10 years, 
according to it does not have cost of war. 
However, in the long run, the net benefit 
decreases because of area depreciation. 
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Figure 46: Area in Control 
Co-development area will reach the 
desired area before the base run.  
 
Base run (blue), Scenario3 (red) and Scenorio4 (pink) 
 
Scenarios Comparison  
 
Figure 47: Total Net Benefit for all Scenario, prioritized by number 
The total net benefit of all 
scenarios shows that the base 
scenario (blue) gives the best 
benefit about 18 trillion USD. 
The worst benefit is scenario 
4(green); it is minus for 47 
trillion USD. 
 
Figure 48: Total Cost of War 
The cost of war from 
scenario 3 (green), reach to 
87 trillion USD. In contrast, it 
is 0 for sharing scenario 
(orange). 
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Figure 49: Comparison for All Scenarios, prioritized by number 
Net benefit yearly shows 
the decreasing decreasingly in 
scenario 3 (green), the others 
will reach to equilibriums. 
 
 
Figure 50: Comparison for National Power 
The best National Power is 
Scenario1 (red). Scenario3 
(green) National power get 
effect in economic, so it 
decrease under 1. 
 Base scenario (blue) is not 
included National Power in the 
model, so it is stable at 1. 
Discussion 
According to a main purpose of the thesis is to examine the potential war in SCS by 
simulation SCS war scenarios. The simulation might help to answer the questions such is war an 
answer for China in SCS? How the situation could be? Are there any alternative solutions 
beyond the war?  
The study results, there are two points of view to be discussed. 
1. The generic model and its usability 
 The model covers mechanism of war as a national strategy. But, in term of the national power 
element, the model does not cover all relation of each national power element. Only economic 
and military elements are taken in account. But it is enough for China that can control political 
and Social-psychological element, so they do not effect to national strategy.  
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 However, the simulation for all scenarios reflect hypothesis of war dynamics and costs, where 
the boundary are point of adding after-war cost, the point of long term cost-benefit.  
2. SCS war implementation 
The base scenario reflects environments of conventional security thought which ignores the 
horizontal relation between each National Power elements, in other words, isolates the issue in 
front line(battle field) and back line(peace area) absolutely. The scenario bases on the 
assumption that CH can control other intervention. And the war in SCS is a close system. The 
result shows the worthwhile of CH to conquer the SCS in long term till year 2100. Even though 
at the beginning, it might be risky at the lost in net benefit for 6 years approximately. The net 
benefit is in deficit because the loop of war is stronger than the benefit production. But in the 
long term, the base case represents the positive benefit. However, as the base scenario is like an 
experiment in the closed room without any noise to system.  
1st scenario (SCS War and Hidden Cost) has expanded the frame of conservation security by 
considering the hidden cost of war which should be accounted. By adding this cost, the result 
shows that, in short term but longer than the base case, China still has risk of lost benefit. It will 
get the positive benefit in the middle term. And finally in long term, it lost. 
The hidden cost of war is the cost that directs variation to the intensive of war. And it 
always comes with life time approximated from the life of soldiers who come back from the war 
and still alive or got injure or became handicap.  This cost will start and remain around 40 years. 
The distinction of this cost can be seen around 10 years after war has started in the simulation. 
And it makes very big difference comparing to the base scenario. Thus the hidden cost is implied 
in either term of quantitative and qualitative. Thus the hidden cost is considered as a part of the 
model.  
In the 2nd scenario (SCS War with Strong Military Resistance), the result shows that China 
never gets positive net benefit from the war.  
In this scenario, if there is an intervention from 3rd party to support the opponents, the war 
will be hard to finish. China has to fight with the strong opponents. The lost from war is high 
meanwhile the benefit is low. There is no point of getting advantage in this situation. 
3rd Scenario (War with Strong Military Resistance and Non-military Resistance) If the 
strong opponents happen, the war will be as a major war. There will be effects on world 
sensitivity.  According to the major war will effect on the stability of the area which will 
decrease the international trade and oil route. The effect of non-military will be considered and 
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taken in account. The scenario shows that, not only China will lose tremendously at the 
battlefield, but it also loses in economics. 
All the war scenarios seem to be deadlocks, what is the alternative scenario possible?  There 
actually have been many alternative solutions for SCS. However, one of the notable ways is 
about regional cooperation. For this solution, China and each opponent have to make a 
negotiation to share the area and the benefit. 
The 4th scenario (Alternative solution by sharing and avoiding war) shows that China does 
not get total net benefit as good as the base case because it has to share the benefit with each 
opponent. However, there is no war happen, so China does not have to waste the budget on war. 
 From all scenario simulated, the base scenario seem to be the best way for China if it 
control all factors as in the model. But in the realistic, a lot of the factors are uncontrollable. 
Thus in term of strategy, the goal of China might have to change; otherwise it has to do every 
way to manage the risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION & FURTURE REASEARCH 
“Victorious Warriors win first and then go to war,  
While defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win” 
Sun Tzu 
Systematically consideration, war might not be a good answer for China in SCS. The 
scenarios from this study have drawn this conclusion by the cost and dynamics of potential war 
in SCS.   
For any war in the world, there have been many misperceptions of wars in the world history. 
Such misperceptions are war itself and war consequences. The obvious and up to date case is the 
war on terrorism. First, a very big blunder in estimation of military strategy and operation, by 
many reasons, the US and allies’ forces underestimated of its opponents’ capability who led to 
the war exist longer than their estimation. And second, they (policy makers) also ignored and 
used misperception of war cost and war dynamics as well. 
These two types of misperceptions are very interesting. They actually could be classic cases 
for reference and studied by System Dynamics. However, this thesis has been focused on the 
second misperception which is about cost and dynamics of war.  
The essences gotten from this study can be concluded that  
“For China, the most powerful who design the future of SCS, introspection at Costs and 
dynamics of war is important. Because such issues are widely affect to others issues of the 
nation. However, lack of systematic consideration about war, led many nations fall in 
misperceptions of war and still try to start it. This study has exemplified parts of misperception 
which show directly affects on economic sector; this link has crossed the boundary of war in the 
battle field to the territory of peace. The consequence of this link will be extended to various 
elements as un-estimation dynamics.  
“Thus war could not be thought in the term of military itself, but it should be scrutinized in 
the top view of national strategy and the implementation of national power. Otherwise, the win 
in the battle field by military capability might lead to the lost of the nation” 
As Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the 
means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”  Thus, strategy was 
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“the linking together of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of 
the war.”  And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. (Jablonsky 2010) 
   Finally, this study, there are some points those are excluded and should be challenge to 
research more. 
1. The effect of war on oil price. This relation is still in argument among economists(Stiglitz 
and Bilmes 2008). However, each war has different conditions, thus for the SCS case, 
there need to model more about the oil sector to examine that SCS war will increase or 
decrease the demand of oil and how the oil from SCS support China or the world supply. 
2. The effect of war on economic, like the effect on oil price, it might be various to each 
country. There are some literatures agree that war might soar the GDP. The reason that 
war increases GDP growth rates in country such the countries that have military industry 
as the main production. However, this study assumes that SCS war gives negative effect 
to China GDP as a part of trade sanction from world community. In other words, it can be 
mentioned from World Bank report 2009 that war will reduce GDP growth rate in average 
(0.6%). Thus, there need more research that whether China gets positive effect on GDP or 
not. 
3. War and Climate Change, according to war consumes enormously of energy (Karbuz 
2006 ; Perrin 2010; Karbuz 2011) Thus it is a source of CO2 emission as well. A good 
example that DOD is trying to decrease its energy consumption by promote of alternative 
energy, efficiency of energy use. The climate change can be measured as cost as well. 
Moreover, it is a very interesting dynamics effect from war.  
4. The complete consideration of National Power elements, the relation between all elements 
should be included in the model. The advance model including all national power 
elements will show more justifiable dynamics of war which can be refer to the national 
strategy.  
5. Even this thesis examine for the long run (2000-2100), however it still lacks of 
consideration about monetary value. Thus, the consideration about real value of present 
value should be done. This might improve the work complete. 
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APPENDIX I 
Variables and Information  
 The data used in model is an important element of model building. The rectified and 
acceptable data will support the model to be justified and reasonable. In this study there are two 
main methods concern to data used. Firstly, the information used in the model such as military 
capability, China trade trend etc. are related to many sources of references. All the rare data is 
collected as primary information process then it was interpreted in to monetary term. Secondly, 
to make sure that the model is not much sensitive on the unsure variables, the model is validated 
in the method of validation. 
 Military information refer from the world military expenditure database of SIPRI1; this 
database does not only present the military expenditure of countries in the world but it also show 
several papers concern to world and regional military trend. However, the data from SIPRI is 
decoded to the expenditure in SCS by an assumption from area (sea) size. 
 
Table 3: China and Total Opponents Military Expenditure 
By the data in Table 3, CH initial expenditure in SCS is approximately for 10 percent of its 
total expenditure. Thus in year 2010 CH military in SCS should be around $11,000 billion/year. 
   South China Sea resources approximation this information are mentioned from many 
sources. However, it must be noted that this data is an important issue, because it effects on the 
result of net benefit which show the wealthiest of China in the SCS war as well.  
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AREA km
^2
 
SCS total area
2
 3,500,000 
CH desired area for 80 % of total area 2,800,000 
Currently CH control area 350,000 
Table 4: Area 
Resources in SCS Value Unit comment 
O
IL
  
crude oil
3
 213  billion barrel 
CH consumption per year at year 3  bbl per year Year 2010 
oil price 2010 by IEA 98  $/bbl 
 Benefit from Oil per area per year 294  $ billion/area/ year  IEA 
N
a
tu
ra
l 
G
a
s 
Gas(tcf)
3
 2000 Tcf Trillion Cubic Feet 
Gas ( cu m) 5.664E+13 cu m 
Gas price  150 $ / kilo cum Year 2010 
CH consumption of gas
4
 8.7 Billion CUM  Cubic Meter 
CH income from gas 13.5 $ billion/year 
time to finish gas in SCS 651.03  years   
Fi
sh
e
ry
 
Real china fishery value in 2008
5
 8.2 $ billion  
Estimation income in SCS 32.8 $ billion / year 
Benefit from abundant resource area 339.85 $ billion/year 
Benefit from devalued area 58.9 $ billion/year 
Table 5: Resources and Benefit 
Benefit per Area per Year Benefit per Area ($/Km
^2
) Note 
Oil Value  105,000 294 $ billion / 2,800,000 Km
^2
 
Gas Value 46,428.57 13.5 $ billion /2,800,000 Km
^2
 
Fishery  11,714.29 32.8 $ billion /2,800,000 Km
^2
 
Benefit Abundant area 163,142.9  0.16 $mil/ Km
^2 
/ Year 
Benefit Devalued area 58,142.86  0.06 $mil/Km
^2 
 / Year 
Table 6: Estimated Benefit 
Adjustment time Years Note 
time of CH military in SCS improvement 1 Approximation from annual budget 
time of opponents military improvement 2  
time of 3
rd
  supporting 1.5  
time of non-military effect 1  
Time of after-war cost effecting 40 Age of veterans 
Time of area depreciation 20 
At current consumption, oil in SCS can 
support for 20 years 
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Timeline: Disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) 
Source : The Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA 2011) 
19 July 2011 The South China Sea dispute is a key topic of discussion at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali. Indonesian 
President expresses frustration over the drawn-out nature of the talks and urges foreign ministers to accelerate negotiations and 
finalize guidelines. The Philippines announces that it will send five congressmen to the disputed Spratly Islands to support its 
territorial claims; China says the trip "serves no purpose but to undermine peace and stability in the region and sabotage the 
China-Philippines relationship."  
17 July 2011 A small group of Vietnamese march to denounce China's actions despite a police crackdown.  
15 July 2011 Vietnam and US launch a series of naval exchanges. The exercises are confined to noncombat training and 
are stressed by the US to be part of routine exchanges that were planned months in advance. China deems the timing of the 
exercises "inappropriate," saying they should have been rescheduled.  
14 July 2011 Armed Chinese soldiers allegedly beat a Vietnamese fisherman and threaten other crew members before 
driving them out of waters near the contested Paracel Islands.  
13 July 2011 The Philippines states that China's refusal to allow a UN-backed tribunal to rule on the territorial dispute 
indicates that Beijing's claim stands on shaky legal ground.  
11 July 2011 American and Chinese military chiefs argue about US exercises in the SCS; Chinese army chief says the US 
military exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam were "extremely inappropriate”. The US remains committed to maintaining 
its presence in the Sea.  
9 July 2011 The US, Japanese and Australian navies hold a joint drill in the SCS, Japan's first joint military exercise in the 
territory.  
6 July 2011 The Philippines' Foreign Secretary Alberto Rosario visits China to seek a diplomatic solution. He calls for the 
dispute to go before a UN tribunal, but China rejects the proposal. The two countries agree "not to let the maritime disputes affect 
the broader picture of friendship and cooperation of the two countries."  
3 July 2011   About 100 anti-China protesters march peacefully in Vietnam, denouncing China's actions in the Sea, despite  
a heavy security clampdown.  
28 June 2011 The US and the Philippines begin routine naval drills near the SCS.  
27 June 2011 The US Senate unanimously passes a resolution condemning China’s use of force in the SCS, urging a 
peaceful, multilateral solution. China rejects the resolution, saying that the disputes should only be resolved through negotiations 
between claimants and maintaining that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the entire Sea.  
26 June 2011 China and Vietnam agree to hold talks and resolve the territorial dispute. China reports a pact with Vietnam 
to resolve the conflict through “negotiations and friendly consultations,” though no detail is provided on how these negotiations 
will take place.  
25 June 2011 The US calls for China to cool tensions over the disputed territory and reiterates its commitment to 
defending its longtime ally, the Philippines. China rejects this call, telling the US to stay out of its regional disputes.  
23 June 2011 The Philippines says it hopes to lease naval equipment from the US in the face of rising friction with China.  
18 June 2011 The US and Vietnam jointly call for freedom of navigation and rejects the use of force in the SCS.  
13 June 2011 Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the SCS. Anti-China protests break out in Hanoi, as more than 100 people 
demonstrate against what they see as bullying behaviour by Beijing. Taiwan, which claims the Spratlys, Paracel and Pratas 
islands in its constitution, mulls strengthening its presence in the area by sending missile boats.  
12 June 2011 Anti-China rallies continue in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi for a second straight weekend. Vietnam seeks 
US support in the dispute. 
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9 June 2011 Vietnam reports that a Chinese fishing boat, supported by Chinese naval patrols, cut a cable being used by a 
craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam. Vietnam says the ship was operating over its continental shelf and 
within its exclusive economic zone.  
8 June 2011 China steps up its criticism of the Philippines, calling on Manila to stop infringing its sovereignty with claims 
over the SCS.  
5 June 2011 The SCS dispute dominates discussion at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Vietnam confirms that it 
holds China responsible for the 27 May incident, while China commits itself to maintaining peace and stability in the Sea. US 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates warns that “there will be clashes” in the Sea unless multilateral mechanisms are strengthened.  
1 June 2011 Manila reports that Chinese navy boats erected pillars and set unloaded materials near Amy Douglas Bank 
inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.  
28 May 2011 China criticizes Vietnam for its offshore exploration of oil and gas in the Sea.  
27 May 2011 Chinese patrol boats cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship while performing an underwater survey of the SCS. 
Vietnam accuses China of violating its sovereignty and a 1982 UN convention on the law of the sea, while China argues that 
Vietnam’s oil and gas operations have undermined China’s interests and rights in the area. 
13 April 2011 The Philippines states that Beijing’s stance on the disputed areas in the Sea have no basis under 
international law.  
28 March 2011 The Philippines announces its increase in air and naval patrols and its plans to upgrade an airstrip on an 
island it occupies in the SCS.  
4 March 2011 The Philippines reports that two Chinese patrol boats threatened to ram a survey ship near the Reed Bank 
23 July 2010 China is angered after the United States takes up the issue of disputes in the SCS at a regional forum.  
March 2005 Oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines sign a deal to jointly protect oil and gas resources in 
the Sea. 
 May 2003 Vietnam issues a “sovereignty” declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the SCS, claiming that Vietnam 
has rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.  
November 2002 China and ASEAN adopt the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the SCS, setting the stage for 
possible commercial cooperation and long-term stability.  
2000 In May, Chinese and Philippine foreign ministers agree to “contribute positively toward the formulation and adoption 
of the regional Code of Conduct in the SCS.” In December, Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve long-standing 
territorial disputes over the Gulf of Tonkin.   
1995 China and the Philippines have a conflict in Mischief Reef, signaling China’s aggression toward nations besides 
Vietnam in the SCS. In August, the Philippines and China reject the use of force to settle their disputes; the Philippines and 
Vietnam negotiate a similar creed in November.  
1994 China distributes a map claiming the entire SCS, including all the Spratly Islands.  
1992 China lands forces on Da Ba Dau reef near Vietnam’s claims in Sin Cowe East, triggering a small military skirmish 
between the two powers. Amid mounting criticism, China offers to negotiate Spratly disputes and reiterates its pledge not to use 
force.  
1991 China passes the Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas, formalizing its claim to the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands.  Indonesia organises a meeting for the six claimants to the Spratly Islands to find a peaceful solution. At the 
meeting, China and other countries along the SCS agree to resolve differences peacefully and to avoid unilateral actions that 
would increase tension.  
1988 China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands in March.  
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1978 Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos claims the entire territory as part of the Philippines, redrawing the country’s 
map.  
1975 South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.  
1974 In January, Chinese military units seize islands in the Paracels, occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and 
China claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.  
1951 Japan renounces all rights to the Spratly Islands. No resolution is made on who owns them.  
1947 The Philippines claims some of the eastern Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Reef.  
1946 China declares the Spratlys as part of Guangdong province.   
1939 The Spratly Islands are invaded and occupied by Japan during the Second World War.   
1885 China officially claims all the Spratly Islands.  
200-300BC China first discovers the Spratly Islands and other islands in the SCS, and begins to occupy and govern them.   
Equations 
Sector 1 : SCS war  
mili_spp__from_3rd_parties(t) = mili_spp__from_3rd_parties(t - dt) + (mili_spp__rate - mili_spp__depreciative_rate) * 
dtINIT mili_spp__from_3rd_parties = 0 
INFLOWS: mili_spp__rate = if scenarios= 3 or scenarios=4 then (net_forces__in_SCS-
mili_spp__from_3rd_parties)*policy_of_3rd_spp/time_of__3rd_spp else 0 
OUTFLOWS: mili_spp__depreciative_rate = mili_spp__from_3rd_parties*actual_lost__of_opponents_in_scs 
opnt_capability___in_scs(t) = opnt_capability___in_scs(t - dt) + (opnt_increse__rate - opnt__depreciative__rate) * dtINIT 
opnt_capability___in_scs = 20000 
INFLOWS: opnt_increse__rate = if time >=war_start_time then 
opnts_forces_desired_in_SCS/adj_time_of_opn_mili_improvement else 0 
OUTFLOWS: opnt__depreciative__rate =  opnt_capability___in_scs*actual_lost__of_opponents_in_scs 
relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs(t) = relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs(t - dt) + (incrs_rate__of_ch_utl_in_scs - 
dcrs_rat_of_ch_utl_in_scs) * dtINIT relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs = sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs 
INFLOWS: incrs_rate__of_ch_utl_in_scs = if 
improvement_desired_of_CH_mili_in_SCS=relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs then 0 else 
(improvement_desired_of_CH_mili_in_SCS-relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs)/time_of_ch__military__improvement 
OUTFLOWS: dcrs_rat_of_ch_utl_in_scs = if scenarios=5 or incrs_rate__of_ch_utl_in_scs>0 then 0 else if 
national_power<1 then 0*(1-national_power)*relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs else 0 
actual_lost__of_ch_in_scs =  lost_from_war*opnt_forces__operation_in_scs*posibility_of_ch_lost 
actual_lost__of_opponents_in_scs = if time>=war_start_time then lost_from_war*posibility_of_opnt_lost else 0 
adj_time_of_opn_mili_improvement = 2 
ch_capabity_i_n_scs = if(sharing_policy=1) and time>=war_start_time then 
((relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs*Ch_mili_base_capability)) else 
(relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs*Ch_mili_base_capability/3) 
ch_force__operation_in_scs = if ((scenarios=5) or time<war_start_time) then 0 else if objective__area =0 then 0 else if 
SWITH_GDP_or_not=1 then ch_capabity_i_n_scs else determinated_by_GDP 
Ch_mili_base_capability = FV_Fnct*Ch_mili_base__in_scs 
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Ch_mili_base__in_scs = if time >=2900 then 0 else 13300 
ch_normal_area = 350000 
cost_of_area_protection = if sharing_policy<2 then 
((occupation__area_in_scs/350000)*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs)*cut__area_protection__loop_test else  
((occupation__area_in_scs/350000)*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs/3)*cut__area_protection__loop_test 
cost_to_conquer = if objective__area=0 then 0 else if (time>=war_start_time and ch_force__operation_in_scs>0) then 
((objective__area/ch_normal_area)*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs)+(superiority_need*opnt_forces__operation_in_scs/ch_for
ce__operation_in_scs) else 0 
cut__area_protection__loop_test = 0 
determinated_by_GDP = CH_AT_WAR_GDP*percentage_at_war*relative_growth_of_ch_mili_in_scs 
forces_ratio__ch_and_opn = if(opnt_forces__operation_in_scs=0) then 0.0000001 else 
ch_force__operation_in_scs/opnt_forces__operation_in_scs 
FV_Fnct = ((1+0.00)^(time-war_start_time)) 
improvement_desired_of_CH_mili_in_SCS = if cost_to_conquer = 0 then 
0+(cost_of_area_protection*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs) 
else(((cost_of_area_protection*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs)+(cost_to_conquer*sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs*1)+sch_
mili_normal__policy_in_scs)) 
net_forces__in_SCS = if (ch_force__operation_in_scs-opnt_forces__operation_in_scs<0) then 0 else 
ch_force__operation_in_scs-opnt_forces__operation_in_scs 
opnts_forces_desired_in_SCS =  Min((percentage__normal_opnt_mili_in_scs*opnt_mili_strengh), 
(ch_force__operation_in_scs-opnt_capability___in_scs)) 
opnt_forces__operation_in_scs = if ch_force__operation_in_scs=0 then 0 else 
(opnt_capability___in_scs+mili_spp__from_3rd_parties)*1 
percentage_at_war = 0.05 
percentage__normal_opnt_mili_in_scs = 0.05 
policy_of_3rd_spp = if superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS>5 then 1 else 1 
sch_mili_normal__policy_in_scs = 1 
superiority_need = 5 
superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS = if time<war_start_time then 0 else if ((opnt_forces__operation_in_scs =0 )) then 999 else 
ch_force__operation_in_scs/opnt_forces__operation_in_scs 
SWITH_GDP_or_not = 1 
time_of_ch__military__improvement = 1/national_power 
time_of__3rd_spp = 1.5 
war_start_time = 2020 
effect_of__war_on_world_community = GRAPH(if (ch_force__operation_in_scs=0) then 0 else 
ch_force__operation_in_scs/opnt_forces__operation_in_scs) 
opnt_mili_strengh = GRAPH(TIME) 
posibility_of_ch_lost = GRAPH(forces_ratio__ch_and_opn) 
posibility_of_opnt_lost = GRAPH(forces_ratio__ch_and_opn) 
Sector 2: Area and Benefit 
abundant__resources_area(t) = abundant__resources_area(t - dt) + (use_rate - depretiation__rate) * dtINIT  
abundant__resources_area = 0 
XVIII 
 
INFLOWS: use_rate = gap_on_in_use/time_of_area_being_used 
OUTFLOWS: depretiation__rate = abundant__resources_area/depretiation_of_area 
devalue_area(t) = devalue_area(t - dt) + (depretiation__rate) * dtINIT devalue_area = 0 
INFLOWS: depretiation__rate = abundant__resources_area/depretiation_of_area 
occupation__area_in_scs(t) = occupation__area_in_scs(t - dt) + (ch_cq_rate) * dtINIT occupation__area_in_scs = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_cq_rate = if time__to_conquer>100 then 0 else objective__area/time__to_conquer 
abundant_resources_area_production = .2*FV_of_oil 
adj_time_for_sharing = 5 
adj_time_to_use_in_sharing = 5 
benefit_from__SCS = if sharing_policy=2 then 
((abundant__resources_area*abundant_resources_area_production)+(devalue_area*devalue_area_production)))/2 else 
((abundant__resources_area*abundant_resources_area_production)+(devalue_area*devalue_area_production)) 
ch__scs_desired_area = desired_area*policy_function 
depretiation_of_area = 20 
desired_area = 2800000 
devalue_area_production = .1*FV_of_oil 
FV_of_oil = if FV_Fnct > 1 then ((1+0.00)^(time-war_start_time)) else 1 
gap_on_in_use = (occupation__area_in_scs*1)-abundant__resources_area-devalue_area 
objective__area = ch__scs_desired_area-occupation__area_in_scs 
policy_function = if (policy_to_war=1 or sharing_policy=2) and (time>=war_start_time) then 1 else if policy_to_war=0 
then 0  else 0 
time_of_area_being_used = if (sharing_policy=2)then 5 else if superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS=999 then 10000000000 else if 
(superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS) >=5 and sharing_policy=1 then effect_of_superiority_on_time_to_use_area else if 
(sharing_policy=2) then adj_time_to_use_in_sharing else effect_of_superiority_on_time_to_use_area 
time__to_conquer = if(sharing_policy=2)then adj_time_for_sharing else if superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS=999 then 
1000000000000 else   effect_of_superiority__on_time_to_conquer 
effect_of_superiority_on_time_to_use_area = GRAPH(superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS) 
effect_of_superiority__on_time_to_conquer = GRAPH(superiority_of_Ch_in_SCS) 
Sector 3: Non-military effect 
CH_AT_WAR_GDP(t) = CH_AT_WAR_GDP(t - dt) + (CH_GDP_AT_War__Growth_rate) * dtINIT 
CH_AT_WAR_GDP = 55000 
INFLOWS: CH_GDP_AT_War__Growth_rate = (CH_AT_WAR_GDP*((CH_GDP__Growth_Fraction*(1-
effect_of_non_military_effect_on_ch_economic))+effect_of_scs_benefit_on_gdp_growth)) 
CH_normal_GDP(t) = CH_normal_GDP(t - dt) + (CH_GDP__normal__Growth_rate) * dtINIT CH_normal_GDP = 55000 
INFLOWS: CH_GDP__normal__Growth_rate = CH_normal_GDP*CH_GDP__Growth_Fraction 
Non_military_effect(t) = Non_military_effect(t - dt) + (non_mili_effct_rate) * dtINIT Non_military_effect = 0 
INFLOWS: non_mili_effct_rate = if (gap_of__non_military_effect>0) then 
(gap_of__non_military_effect/adj_time_of__non_mili_effct_active) else 0 
adj_time_of__non_mili_effct_active = 2, CH_GDP__Growth_Fraction = 0.07 
effect_of_non_military_effect_on_ch_economic = Non_military_effect 
effect_of_scs_benefit_on_gdp_growth = benefit_from__SCS/CH_AT_WAR_GDP 
gap_of__non_military_effect = potential__non_mili_effect-Non_military_effect 
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lost_of_CH__GDP = if CH_GDP_AT_War__Growth_rate>CH_GDP__normal__Growth_rate then 0 else 
CH_GDP__normal__Growth_rate-CH_GDP_AT_War__Growth_rate 
potential__non_mili_effect = if (time-war_start_time>=0) then 
effect_of__war_on_world_community*non_mili_effect__function*(1/national_power) else 0 
relative__economic = CH_AT_WAR_GDP/CH_normal_GDP 
Sector 4 : Cost Benefit Sector 
after_war_cost(t) = after_war_cost(t - dt) + (after_war__cost_rate - after_war__dcrs_rate) * dtINIT after_war_cost = 0 
INFLOWS: after_war__cost_rate = ch_force__operation_in_scs*fraction_of__after_war_cost 
OUTFLOWS: after_war__dcrs_rate = after_war_cost/life_time_of_after_war_in_effect 
totall_net_benefit_2(t) = totall_net_benefit_2(t - dt) + (all_net_benefit_rate) * dtINIT totall_net_benefit_2 = 0 
INFLOWS: all_net_benefit_rate = net_benefit 
fraction_of__after_war_cost = if scenarios=1 then 0 else .08 
life_time_of_after_war_in_effect = 40 
net_benefit = sc_benefit_yearly-sc__cost_yearly 
sc_benefit_yearly = benefit_from__SCS 
sc__cost_yearly = if scenarios=1 then ch_force__operation_in_scs+actual_lost__of_ch_in_scs else if scenarios=2 or 
scenarios=3 then ch_force__operation_in_scs+actual_lost__of_ch_in_scs+after_war_cost else if scenarios=4 or  scenarios=5 
then ch_force__operation_in_scs+actual_lost__of_ch_in_scs+lost_of_CH__GDP+after_war_cost  else 0 
total_net_benefit_2__trillion = totall_net_benefit_2/1000000 
Sector 5: National Power Sector 
economic = relative__economic  
military = 1 
national_power =  ((military*3)+(economic*2))/5)*((political+social_psychological)/2) else 1 
political = 1 , social_psychological = 1 
APPENDIX II 
                                                 
Chapter 1 
1
 The territory disputes are in many parts of SCS among the regional nations such China and Philippines, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and Cambodia. However, Singapore, and the two states of the Gulf of Thailand, 
Thailand and Cambodia, are not involved in the South China Sea conflict proper since they do not have claims to the disputed 
islands in the central part of the South China Sea. Cambodia claims, however, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of 
Thailand which overlaps with the Thai and Vietnamese EEZs. See. Kivimäki, T. (2002). War or peace in the South China Sea? 
Copenhagen, NIAS. 
  
2
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand by the 
Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined 
in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, making up today the ten Member States. 
3
 Oxford Dictionary defines “Arms Race” as a competition between nations for superiority in the development and 
accumulation of weapons. See. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/arms+race 
 It was originally used to describe a competition between two or more parties for the best armed forces. Each party 
competes to produce larger numbers of weapons, greater armies, or superior military technology in a technological escalation. 
Nowadays the term is commonly used to describe any competition where there is no absolute goal, only the relative goal of 
staying ahead of the other competitors, essentially the goal of proving to be "better". See. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_race 
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4
 National Power; each country uses its power such diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments 
of national power to influence other nations to benefit back to itself. It can define national power in term of physical term and 
psychological term as well. By this war, diplomatic and information are psychological, military and economic are physical. 
National power represents the will of nation from psychological term and it represents the means available from physical term. 
The use of military component is war.  
 Elements of National Power  
“Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been measured by 
such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard 
power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want. […] Soft power is the ability to attract people to our 
side without coercion.” See. Armitage, R. L. and S. N. Joseph (2007). "CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More 
Secure America." Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
  
 
5
 In 1982, the U.N. adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in an effort to peacefully 
settle disputes over maritime matters. Despite several oversights, UNCLOS remains the most recognizable document regarding 
maritime disputes. Within UNCLOS, three sections are generally recognized as being most relevant to the South China Sea 
dispute. Article 3 states: Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 
nautical miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with this convention.  
See. Nations, U. (1982 ). "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ". 2010, from 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en. 
  
6
 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine 
resources, including production of energy from water and wind. It stretches from the seaward edge of the state's territorial sea out 
to 200 nautical miles from its coast. In casual usage, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf 
beyond the 200-mile limit.  
See. Nations, U. (1982). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. U. Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. 
  
7
 Oxford Dictionaries Online defines many terms of war  
I. a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country 
II. a state of competition or hostility between different people or groups 
III. a sustained campaign against an undesirable situation or activity 
See. Oxford.Dictionaries.Online.project (2011). Oxford Dictionaries Online. O. D. O. p. team, Oxford University Press. 
  
8
 An ancient Chinese military general authored The Art of War, an influential ancient Chinese book on military strategy. He 
has had a significant impact on Chinese and Asian history and culture, his work has continued to influence both Asian and 
Western culture and politics. 
9
 Carl von Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as the most important of the major strategic theorists. 
10
 An English soldier, military historian and leading inter-war theorist, said that “Grand strategy should both calculate and 
develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—
for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, 
should regulate the distribution of power between the services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power 
is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of 
diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will....Furthermore, 
while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not 
only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for its security 
and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike 
strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita—still awaiting exploration, and understanding” See. 
Bartholomees, D. J. B. ( 2010). ""Theory of War and Strategy."." Issues I. 
  
11
 The theory of victory is and must be distinct from the theory of war. Security professionals need to think systematically 
about winning. The implication is that military victory (tactical or operational victory) without favorable political outcomes is 
sterile…It certainly is from the point of view of the tactical commander—the view from the perspective of the operational or 
strategic commander might be quite different. It is this characteristic that allowed Saddam Hussein to claim victory after the First 
Gulf War. He suffered a huge tactical and operational loss, but his regime had survived (his strategic objective after the coalition 
intervened). The war was thus a strategic win for him—at least in his eyes and from his perspective. This again suggests the issue 
of who decides who wins and loses, which we will address later. 
 
12
 This website is an initiative of Oxford Research Group (ORG) and represents one part of a larger programme, "Moving 
towards sustainable security" begun in 2006, intends to be an important platform for promoting a better understanding of the real 
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threats to global security in the 21st century and the policies that should be implemented to address those threats at their root 
cause.  
13
 “as the dynamics of world, the environmentally constrained but more populous world…there will be greater scarcity of 
three key resources: food, water and energy. Demand for all three resources is already beyond that which can be sustained at 
current levels…competition for such resources should be expected, both within and between countries, potentially leading in 
extreme cases to conflict”. 
14
 National Power; each country uses its power such diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) 
instruments of national power to influence other nations to benefit back to itself. It can define national power in term of physical 
term and psychological term as well. By this war, diplomatic and information are psychological, military and economic are 
physical. National power represents the will of nation from psychological term and it represents the means available from 
physical term. 
The use of military component is war.  
 
15
 The human and economic costs of these wars will continue for decades, some costs not peaking until mid-century. Many 
of the wars’ costs are invisible to Americans, buried in a variety of budgets, and so have not been counted or assessed.  For 
example, while most people think the Pentagon war appropriations are equivalent to the wars’ budgetary costs, the true numbers 
are twice that, and the full economic cost of the wars much larger yet. Conservatively estimated, the war bills already paid and 
obligated to be paid are $3.2 trillion in constant dollars. A more reasonable estimate puts the number at nearly $4 trillion. 
 
16
 refer to US Defense Energy Support Center Fact Book 2004, the US military fuel consumption increased to 144 million 
barrels, it is 40 million barrels more than the average peacetime usage and the 395 000 barrels per day almost as much as daily 
energy consumption of Greece. See. Karbuz, S. (2006 Feb 25 ). "The US military oil consumption." from 
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/13199. 
   
17
 The U.S. military energy consumption accounts for 80 percent of U.S. government use (government energy use is 2% of 
the total use of nation). By setting official price at $3.03, but including the logistic, the cost can be as $50 a gallon. 
18
 “Military operations are major industrial activities that use massive amounts of fuel and materials that significantly 
contribute to climate change… Military security for protection of global maritime petroleum distribution is part of the acquisition 
process, but in addition, recent Middle Eastern wars may also be related to securing petroleum reserves”.  
 
19
 Energy consumed per active duty military and civilian personal is 35 percent higher than the U.S. energy consumption 
per capita, which is amongst the highest in the world. While consuming that amount of energy, DoD emitted 73 million metric 
tons of CO2, corresponding to over 4 percent of the total emissions in USA… The U.S. is the strongest military power in the 
world and just like any other military in the world, energy, in particular energy derived from oil, is at the heart of that power. Oil 
accounts for nearly 80 percent of total DoD energy consumption, followed by electricity (11 percent), natural gas and coal. 
 
20
 IPB because is the primary mechanism a commander uses to develop his mental vision of how an operation will unfold. 
The four steps of the IPB are defined the battlefield environment, describe the battlefield effects, evaluate the threat, and 
determine enemy courses of action. The standard products of the IPB process include modified combined obstacle overlay, 
situation template, and event template. See. Thomas M. Smith, L. C. and M. David G. Puppolo (2011). "IPB with a Purpose." 
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_2_27/ai_80772560/. 
  
Chapter 3 
1
 Clausewitz pointed out that war is both a physical and moral struggle. His recipe for victory was simple: “If you want to 
overcome your enemy you must match your efforts against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two 
inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.” (italics in original) One can express that as a 
mathematical formula: 
R = M x W 
In the formula, R represents the power of resistance, M is the total means available, and W is the strength of will. Victory 
then is achieved as R approaches zero; that is, as the power of resistance drops to an ineffective level. One can push R toward 
zero by reducing either M or W (or both). In some respects one might think of a strategy designed to attack the M aspect of the 
equation as a physical approach and a strategy designed to address the W aspect as psychological, although making such a 
distinction too starkly can be dangerous since both elements will appear in any strategy. The traditional concept of winning a war 
is based on reducing the enemy’s means of resistance.  
See, J. Boone Bartholomees, j. (2010). "A THEORY OF VICTORY." U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security 
Issues I: 89. 
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Chapter 4 
2
 War and resources price 
Despite many scholars justify that war and resources price is related to each other. However, in this study, such relation is 
excluded by the reason that the disputes in SCS are potential sources which have not produced any supply to the world market 
yet, even the war might increase the demand of oil but for a short time it will make more supply, thus it will not disturb world 
supply in the long term.  
 
3
 China’s GDP and its military expenditure? 
In this study, there might be some questions about the relationship between GDP and military expenditure. There are two 
reasons that the relation is excluded. 
First, the capability of CH and Opponents is very different; it can be considered that CH’GDP is abundant compare to its 
opponent. So, a very small part of its GDP is used in SCS occupation, which roughly calculated around 0.005 percent of GDP. 
SO, the change of CH GDP does not affect much in CH military expenditure in SCS. For the technical explanation of this reason 
can see in Model Validation, section Model adequacy. 
Second, imitation from the super power war like the US’s war, the budget invested at war can be from other source, so it 
means that even the GDP distinctly affects on military expenditure, but if the nation will is at war, the budget can be gain in term 
of borrow or mobilized from other parts. Thus it does not affect in military budget whether there is strongly decreasing in GDP or 
not. Moreover, at war, the nation must set the priority to military section for example about oil consumption as a report from 
Office of Under Secretary of Defense says “Because DOD’s consumption of oil represents the highest priority of all uses, there 
will be no fundamental limits to DOD’s fuel supply for many, many decades.” This present the government can mobilize all 
budgets to support military at war time. See. Karbuz, S. (2006 Feb 25 ). "The US military oil consumption." from 
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/13199. 
  
4
 Beijing reiterated its assertion of control over some 80 percent of the South China Sea and all the islands and reefs in a U-
shaped claim extending deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia. 
See. Richardson, M. (2011, April,3 2011). "Beijing's troubling South China Sea policy." Retrieved May,27, 2011, from 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110428mr.html. 
  
5
 The increasing of opponents’ forces operation in SCS will change according to the principal of 5:1 in naval warfare. 
“Current military doctrine calls for a 5-to-1 attacker to defender ratio for amphibious assaults”. see Moore, F. W. (2000). 
"China's Military Capabilities ". 
  
6
 The calculation in this part is done by the difference between China normal GDP growth rate approximated 8 percent per 
year subtract with at war GDP growth rate. 
 
7
 Estimated from the 10% of  China military annual budget in year 2010(SIPRI) 
 
1
 According to Virtual Library South China Sea, the area of SCS is around 3,500,000  sq km2    
See, Rosenberg, D. (2010, June 15, 2010). "the Asian Studies WWW Virtual Library South China Sea." from 
http://www.southchinasea.org/why.html. 
    
2
 This is approximation by the U.S. war on terror which is around 1%. However, SCS war will be a naval ware 
fare, so the veteran should be lower than land warfare. 
1
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2010). SIPRI 
yearbook 2010 : armaments, disarmaments and international security. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
  
2
 According to Virtual Library South China Sea. See. Rosenberg, D. (2010, June 15, 2010). "the Asian Studies 
WWW Virtual Library South China Sea." from http://www.southchinasea.org/why.html. 
  
3
 The total for the South China Sea could be as high as 213 billion barrels… estimates that the entire South China Sea 
contains more than 2,000 Tcf of natural gas resources. 
See. Globalsecurity.org (2010, 11-07-2011 07:29:48). "South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas." Military. from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-oil.htm. 
   
4
 Natural Gas Units & Online Calculator.  See. http://www.natgas.info/html/natgasunitscalculator.html 
5
 UN global environment facility(GEF)  See. http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1820e/i1820e.pdf 
 
